



# **REDESIGNING PAYMENT TO SUPPORT BETTER PATIENT CARE AND FINANCIALLY VIABLE HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS**


**Harold D. Miller**

**President and CEO**

**Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform**

**[www.CHQPR.org](http://www.CHQPR.org)**

# Healthcare Spending Is the Biggest Driver of Federal Deficits




# Federal Cost Containment Policy Choices

$$\text{MEDICARE SPENDING} = \text{SERVICES TO SENIORS} \times \text{FEES TO PROVIDERS}$$


*Cut Services to Seniors?*

*Cut Fees to Providers?*

# If It's A Choice of Rationing or Rate Cuts, Which is More Likely?



# In Medicaid & Private Insurance, Cuts in Services AND Fees Likely



# What Healthcare Providers Can Do That Payers Can't


MEDICARE,  
MEDICAID,  
COMMERCIAL  
HEALTHCARE  
SPENDING

=

SERVICES  
TO PATIENTS

X


FEES TO  
PROVIDERS



# Reducing Costs Without Rationing: *Can It Be Done?*

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
# Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Prevention and Wellness






# Reducing Costs Without Rationing:


## Avoiding Hospitalizations



# Reducing Costs Without Rationing: Efficient, Successful Treatment




# Reducing Costs Without Rationing Is Also Quality Improvement!



# How Big Are the Opportunities?

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# 5-17% of Hospital Admissions Are Potentially Preventable



Source:  
AHRQ  
HCUP

# Millions of Preventable Events Harm Patients and Increase Costs

Medical Error	# Errors (2008)	Cost Per Error	Total U.S. Cost
Pressure Ulcers	374,964	\$10,288	\$3,857,629,632
Postoperative Infection	252,695	\$14,548	\$3,676,000,000
Complications of Implanted Device	60,380	\$18,771	\$1,133,392,980
Infection Following Injection	8,855	\$78,083	\$691,424,965
Pneumothorax	25,559	\$24,132	\$616,789,788
Central Venous Catheter Infection	7,062	\$83,365	\$588,723,630
Others	773,808	\$11,640	\$9,007,039,005
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,503,323</b>	<b>\$13,019</b>	<b>\$19,571,000,000</b>

**3 Adverse Events Every Minute**

Source: *The Economic Measurement of Medical Errors*, Milliman and the Society of Actuaries, 2010

# Many Ways to Reduce Tests & Services Without Harming Patients

**Choosing Wisely**  
An initiative of the ABIM Foundation

**American Society of Nephrology**

**American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology**

**American Society of Clinical Oncology**

**American Academy of Family Physicians**

- Don't use low performance imaging for cancer treatment.
- Don't routinely prescribe antibiotics for sinusitis unless symptoms worsen after initial clinical trial.
- Don't use dual-energy x-ray for osteoporosis in women 70 with no risk factors.
- Don't order annual electrocardiogram screening for low-risk patients.
- Don't perform Pap smears or had a hysterectomy for non-pap.

**Choosing Wisely**  
An initiative of the ABIM Foundation

**American College of Cardiology**

**Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question**

- Don't perform stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive imaging in the initial evaluation of patients without cardiac symptoms unless high-risk markers are present.
- Don't perform annual stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive imaging as part of routine follow-up in asymptomatic patients.
- Don't perform stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive imaging as a pre-operative assessment in patients scheduled to undergo low-risk non-cardiac surgery.
- Don't perform echocardiography as routine follow-up for mild, asymptomatic native valve disease in adult patients with no change in signs or symptoms.
- Don't perform stenting of non-culprit lesions during percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) for uncomplicated hemodynamically stable ST-segment elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI).

**Choosing Wisely**  
An initiative of the ABIM Foundation

**American Society of Nuclear Cardiology**

**American College of Radiology**

**American College of Physicians**

**American Gastroenterological Association**

**Five Things Physicians and Patients Should Question**

- Patients with gastroesophageal acid suppression therapy (proton pump antagonists) should be titrated to achieve therapeutic goals.
- Screening (by any method) for 10 years negative in average-risk individuals.
- Repeat colonoscopy for patients with adenomatous polyps, without high-quality colonoscopy.
- Barrett's esophagus, who has confirmed the absence of dysplasia examination should not be repeated as per published guidelines.
- Minimal pain syndrome (as per ROME criteria) scans should not be repeated clinical findings or symptoms.

# Instead of Starting With How to *Limit* Care for Patients...

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## ***Contributors to Healthcare Costs***

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### **How Do We Limit:**

- New Technologies
- Higher-Cost Drugs
- Potentially Life-Saving Treatment



# We Should Focus First on How to *Improve* Patient Care

## ***Contributors to Healthcare Costs***


### **How Do We *Help*:**

- Patients Stay Well
- Avoid Preventable Emergencies and Hospitalizations
- Eliminate Errors and Safety Problems
- Reduce Costs of Treatment
- Reduce Complications and Readmissions

### **How Do We *Limit*:**

- New Technologies
- Higher-Cost Drugs
- Potentially Life-Saving Treatment

# Current Payment Systems Reward Bad Outcomes, Not Better Health



# It's Not a Lack of "Incentives," It's the *Barriers* in Fee for Service

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## **Lack of Flexibility in FFS**

- No payment for phone calls or emails with patients
- No payment to coordinate care among providers
- No payment for non-physician support services to help patients with self-management
- No flexibility to shift resources across silos (hospital <-> physician, post-acute <-> hospital, SNF <-> home health, etc.)

# It's Not a Lack of "Incentives," It's the *Barriers* in Fee for Service

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## **Penalty for Quality/Efficiency**

- Lower revenues if patients don't make frequent office visits
- Lower revenues for performing fewer tests and procedures
- Lower revenues if infections and complications are prevented instead of treated
- No revenue at all if patients stay healthy


# There Is Broad Agreement That Payment Reforms Are Needed...

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## FFS

- No payment for services that will benefit patients
- Lower revenues from reducing avoidable costs

# But Most “Payment Reforms” Don’t Fix The Problems with FFS



# Fortunately, There are Better Payment Systems Available

**FFS**

- No payment for services that will benefit patients
- Lower revenues from reducing avoidable costs




**Accountable  
Medical Home**

- Flexible, predictable payments, not tied to office visits


**FFS**




# Fortunately, There are Better Payment Systems Available



# Fortunately, There are Better Payment Systems Available



# True Payment Reform Allows Win-Win-Win Solutions



# Example: Big Reductions Possible in Chronic Disease Spending

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## Examples:

- 40% reduction in hospital admissions, 41% reduction in ER visits for exacerbations of COPD using in-home & phone patient education by nurses or respiratory therapists

J. Bourbeau, M. Julien, et al, "Reduction of Hospital Utilization in Patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease: A Disease-Specific Self-Management Intervention," *Archives of Internal Medicine* 163(5), 2003

- 66% reduction in hospitalizations for CHF patients using home-based telemonitoring


M.E. Cordisco, A. Benjaminovitz, et al, "Use of Telemonitoring to Decrease the Rate of Hospitalization in Patients With Severe Congestive Heart Failure," *American Journal of Cardiology* 84(7), 1999

- 27% reduction in hospital admissions, 21% reduction in ER visits through self-management education

M.A. Gadoury, K. Schwartzman, et al, "Self-Management Reduces Both Short- and Long-Term Hospitalisation in COPD," *European Respiratory Journal* 26(5), 2005


# We Don't Pay for the Things That Will Prevent Overutilization

## CURRENT PAYMENT SYSTEMS




# Option 1: Add New Fee Codes for Unreimbursed PCP Services

## MEDICAL HOME PROGRAM




# Option 2: Pay for Monthly “Care Mgt” to Cover Missing Services

## MEDICAL HOME PROGRAM



# More \$ for PCPs, But Any Savings Elsewhere?


## MEDICAL HOME PROGRAM





# Option 3: “Shared Savings” (More \$ Only If Total Costs Decrease)

## SHARED SAVINGS MODEL




# Weaknesses of “Shared Savings”

- Provides no upfront money to enable physician practices to hire nurse care managers, install IT, etc.; additional funds, if any, come years after the care changes are made
- The underlying fee for service incentives continue; losing less (via shared savings) is still losing compared to FFS
- Requires TOTAL costs to go down in order for the physician practice to receive ANY increase in payment, even if the practice can't control all costs
- Gives more rewards to the *poor* performers who improve than the providers who've done well all along
- I.e., it's not really true *payment reform*

# Option 4: Resources + Accountability


## CARE MGT PAYMENT + UTILIZATION P4P




# Example: Washington State Medical Home Pilot Program

- **Organized by Puget Sound Health Alliance and Washington State Health Care Authority**
- **4-Part Payment Model**
  - **Current FFS payments for PCP services**
  - **Additional PMPM payment for “care management”**
    - \$2.50 per patient per month in Year 1 (part of year)
    - \$2.00 per patient per month in Years 2 & 3
    - No restrictions on how money is used
  - **Targets for Reducing Preventable ER/Hospital Utilization**
    - Reduction targets large enough to repay health plans for upfront payments
    - Penalty for failure: Repayment of up to 50% of PMPM payment
  - **Bonus for success in reducing utilization beyond targets**
    - 50/50 split of payers’ savings from reductions in ER visits and/or hospitalizations net of PMPM payment
    - Quality of care must be maintained based on quality measures
- **Implementation Began May 2011**
  - 7 health plans (5 commercial, 2 Medicaid)
  - 12 primary care practice sites (8 provider orgs), ~ 25,000 patients

# Not Just PCPs, But The Medical Neighborhood, Too



# Pay Both PCPs & Specialists for Outcomes & Coordination




# Minnesota's DIAMOND Initiative

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- Goal: improve outcomes for patients with depression
- Convened all payers in Minnesota (except for Medicare) to agree on common payment changes for PCPs & specialists
- Payment changes:
  - Support for a care manager in the primary care practice
  - Psychiatrists paid to consult with PCP on how to manage patient's care comprehensively, rather than patient having to see psychiatrist separately
- Result: Dramatic improvement in remission rate

[http://www.icsi.org/health\\_care\\_redesign\\_/diamond\\_35953/](http://www.icsi.org/health_care_redesign_/diamond_35953/)


# Impact on Visit Wait Times of Paying for Non-Visit-Based Svcs






# Option 5: Partial Comprehensive Care Payment

## PARTIAL GLOBAL PMT (Professional Svcs)



# Option 6: Risk-Adjusted Full Comprehensive Care Payment

## COMPREHENSIVE CARE/YEAR-LONG EPISODE



# Isn't This Capitation?

## No – It's Different

### **CAPITATION (WORST VERSIONS)**

No Additional Revenue  
for Taking Sicker  
Patients

Providers Lose Money  
On Unusually  
Expensive Cases

Providers Are Paid  
Regardless of the  
Quality of Care

Provider Makes  
More Money If  
Patients Stay Well

Flexibility to Deliver  
Highest-Value  
Services

### **COMPREHENSIVE CARE PAYMENT**

Payment Levels  
Adjusted Based on  
Patient Conditions

Limits on Total Risk  
Providers Accept for  
Unpredictable Events


Bonuses/Penalties  
Based on Quality  
Measurement

Provider Makes  
More Money If  
Patients Stay Well


Flexibility to Deliver  
Highest-Value  
Services

# Transitioning to Accountable Care Payment


## CARE MGT PAYMENT + UTILIZATION P4P



## PARTIAL GLOBAL PMT (Professional Svcs)



## FULL COMP. CARE/GLOBAL PMT + QUALITY P4P



# Truly Flexible Payment Allows Truly Patient-Centered Care

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- If you don't have to bring every patient into the office for a visit in order to be paid, you can focus more attention on the patients who have unique and complex problems and who need more time and attention
- If your profits are based on how healthy your patients are instead of on how many office visits they make or how many procedures you perform, you can focus resources on outreach to high-risk patients to get the preventive services they need to stay well, including sending staff to their home
- If you aren't constrained to spend money only on medical services, you can help patients address non-medical needs that are causing avoidable ER visits and hospitalizations, such as lack of transportation to see their PCP

# Today: Reactive Care for Chronic Disease, Many Hospitalizations

		CURRENT		
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
<b>Physician Svcs</b>				
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
<b>Hospitalizations</b>				
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000
<b>Specialist</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000

## 500 Moderately Severe Chronic Disease Patients

- PCP paid only for periodic office visits
- Patients do not take maintenance medications reliably
- 50% of patients are hospitalized each year for exacerbations
- Specialist only sees patient during hospital admissions

# Is There a Better Way?

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>					?		?	
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	?		?	
<b>Hospitalizations</b>					?		?	
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$1,500,000	?		?	
<b>Specialist</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000	?		?	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000	?		?	

# Pay the PCP for Proactive Care Management

	CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>							
PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>							
Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$1,500,000				
<b>Specialist</b>	\$400	250	\$100,000				
<b>Total Spending</b>		500	\$2,900,000				



# Pay the Specialist to Co-Manage The Patient's Care

	CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
	\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>							
PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>							
Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$1,500,000				
Specialist (Inpt)	\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>		500	\$2,900,000				

# Provide Adequate Resources to Support Patients

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$1,500,000				
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# Can We Afford a 127% Increase in Spending on Ambulatory Care?

		CURRENT		
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
<b>Physician Svcs</b>				
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
	Specialist			
	RN Care Mgr			
	Total			\$300,000
<b>Hospitalizations</b>				
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	\$1,500,000
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000

FUTURE			Chg
\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
		\$80,000	
	500	\$680,000	127%
		\$0	

# Yes, If It Succeeds In Reducing Hospitalizations

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	<del>\$1,500,000</del>	\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000	-40%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,180,000	-25%


# But What About the Hospital?

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Admissions	\$10,000	250	<del>\$1,500,000</del>	\$10,000	150	\$1,500,000	-40%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,180,000	-25%


# What Should Matter to Hospitals is *Margin*, Not Revenues (Volume)

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# Hospital Costs Are Not Proportional to Utilization




# Reductions in Utilization Reduce Revenues More Than Costs






# Causing Negative Margins for Hospitals



# But Spending Can Be Reduced Without Bankrupting Hospitals



# Analyze the Hospital's Cost Structure

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000				
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000				
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000				
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000				
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000				
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# What Happens to Hospital Finances When Admissions Go Down?

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000				
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000				
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000				
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150		
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# Continue to Cover the Fixed Costs

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000				
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000				
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150		
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# Save on Variable Costs With Fewer Patients

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000	\$3,700		\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000				
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150		
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# Increase the Hospital's Contribution Margin

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150		
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000				

# Hospital Gets Less *Total Revenue*, But is Better Off *Financially*

		CURRENT		
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
<b>Physician Svcs</b>				
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
	Specialist			
	RN Care Mgr			
	Total			\$300,000

<b>Hospitalizations</b>				
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000

<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>	\$400	250	\$100,000
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<b>Total Spending</b>		500	\$2,900,000
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FUTURE			Chg
\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
		\$80,000	
	500	\$680,000	127%

		\$1,500,000	-0%
		\$555,000	-40%
		\$82,500	+10%
	150	\$2,137,500	-15%

		\$0	
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# And the Payer Still Spends Less

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150	\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,817,500	-3%

# Win-Win-Win: Better Care, Higher Physician Pay, Lower Spending

		CURRENT		
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$
<b>Physician Svcs</b>				
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000
	Specialist			
	RN Care Mgr			
	Total			\$300,000

<b>Hospitalizations</b>				
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000

<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>	\$400	250	\$100,000
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<b>Total Spending</b>		500	\$2,900,000
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FUTURE			Chg
\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
		\$80,000	
	500	\$680,000	127%

Physicians Win  
Hospital Wins  
Payer Wins

		\$1,500,000	-0%
		\$555,000	-40%
		\$82,500	+10%
	150	\$2,137,500	-15%

		\$0	
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	500	\$2,817,500	-3%
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# What Payment Model Supports This Win-Win-Win Approach?

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000		150	\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,817,500	-3%

# You Don't Want to Try and Renegotiate Individual Fees

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total	\$10,000	250	\$2,500,000	\$14,250	150	\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>			500	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,817,500	-3%

# Look at What is Being Spent Today in *Total* on the Patient's *Condition*

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total		250	\$2,500,000		150	\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>		<b>\$5,800</b>	<b>500</b>	\$2,900,000		500	\$2,817,500	-3%

# Tell the Payer You'll Do It For Less Than They're Spending Today

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000	\$900	500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist				\$300	500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000		500	\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total		250	\$2,500,000		150	\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>		<b>\$5,800</b>	<b>500</b>	<del>\$2,900,000</del>	<b>\$5,635</b>	<b>500</b>	\$2,817,500	<b>-3%</b>

# Use That Budget to Pay Doctors & Hospitals What They Really Need

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000		500	\$450,000	+50%
	Specialist					500	\$150,000	+50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000			\$680,000	+127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total			\$2,500,000			\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>		<b>\$5,800</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>\$2,900,000</b>	<b>\$5,635</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>\$2,817,500</b>	<b>-3%</b>

# Condition-Based Payment Puts the *Providers* in Charge of Care & Pmt

		CURRENT			FUTURE			Chg
		\$/Patient	# Pts	Total \$	\$/Pt	# Pts	Total \$	
<b>Physician Svcs</b>								
	PCP	\$600	500	\$300,000		500	\$450,000	-50%
	Specialist					500	\$150,000	-50%
	RN Care Mgr						\$80,000	
	Total			\$300,000			\$680,000	127%
<b>Hospitalizations</b>								
	Hospital Fixed	\$6,000	60%	\$1,500,000			\$1,500,000	-0%
	Hosp. Variable	\$3,700	37%	\$925,000			\$555,000	-40%
	Hosp. Margin	\$300	3%	\$75,000			\$82,500	+10%
	Total			\$2,500,000			\$2,137,500	-15%
<b>Specialist (Inpt)</b>		\$400	250	\$100,000			\$0	
<b>Total Spending</b>		<b>\$5,800</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>\$2,900,000</b>	<b>\$5,635</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>\$2,817,500</b>	<b>-3%</b>



# “Shared Savings” Doesn’t Solve the Problems with FFS

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- No actual change in payment to the physicians
  - No funding for the nurse
  - No payment for phone calls instead of office visits
  - No flexibility to proactive outreach instead of reactive care
- Arbitrary “share” of savings may not be sufficient to cover higher costs of care or losses from FFS revenue
  - 50% of savings is not adequate if >50% of costs are fixed
- No shared savings payment at all unless minimum savings threshold is met, and shared savings payments are reduced if quality in other areas is not improved
- All savings goes back to Medicare/health plan at end of contract period, with no permanent change in payment for physicians

# How Patients w/ Behavioral Health Issues Receive Care Today

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


# Some Have Serious BH Issues and Are Managed by BH System


Patients with  
Serious  
Issues  
Receiving  
Principal  
Care  
Through  
Behavioral  
Health  
System

Patient  
with  
BH  
issue


# Some Are Identified by PCPs and Referred to Psychiatry/BH




# But Patients May Not Follow Through on the Referral




# Some Patients Treated for Physical Issues May Really Be BH Issues



# Some Patients May Go to ER for Physical Issues; Really BH Issues




# Worse Outcomes for Chronic Disease w/o Addressing BH Issues






# How Care Would Be Redesigned:

## 1. Screening/Intervention at Visits




# How Care Would Be Redesigned:

## 2. Proactive Screening & Referral



# Expected Impacts on Costs and Outcomes



# What's the Right Number of BH Specialists Per Practice?

- **Workload for Behavioral Health Specialist for Immediate Intervention:**
  - PCP screening of 2,000 patient panel will result in 350 immediate referrals to the on-site Behavioral Health Specialist
  - For 350 warm handoff referrals:
    - 2 visits/patient @ 45 minutes/visit = 700 visits/500 hours
    - 1 phone call/patient @ 15 minutes/call = 350 calls/90 hours
    - Total: 590 hours/year = .3 FTE
    - Slack time needed to ensure immediate availability = .1 FTE?
  - 3-4 doc practice = 1 FTE Behavioral Health Specialist for warm handoffs


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    - 1 phone call/patient @ 15 minutes/call = 350 calls/90 hours
    - Total: 590 hours/year = .3 FTE
    - Slack time needed to ensure immediate availability = .1 FTE?
  - 3-4 doc practice = 1 FTE Behavioral Health Specialist for warm handoffs
- **Workload for Behavioral Health Specialist for On-Site Treatment:**
  - 50 patients may need ongoing behavior health support through PCP
    - 12 visits/patient/year @ 1 hour/visit = 600 hours/year = .3 FTE
  - 3-4 doc practice = 1 FTE Behavioral Health Specialist for treatment
  - Both screening and treatment allows presence in small practices, but need to preserve slack time for immediate interventions


# What's the Right Number of BH Specialists Per Practice?

- **Workload for Behavioral Health Specialist for Immediate Intervention:**
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  - 50 patients may need ongoing behavior health support through PCP
    - 12 visits/patient/year @ 1 hour/visit = 600 hours/year = .3 FTE
  - 3-4 doc practice = 1 FTE Behavioral Health Specialist for treatment
  - Both screening and treatment allows presence in small practices, but need to preserve slack time for immediate interventions
- **Cost of On-Site or Remote Behavioral Health Support**
  - \$90,000 salary+benefits+overhead for Behavioral Health Specialist
  - \$50,000 salary+benefits+overhead for registry/administrative support
  - \$15,000 + \$5,000/year for video link equipment and maintenance
  - \$? for management, insurance, etc. from behavioral health agency

# Staffing Model for Behavioral Health Specialists



# Staffing Model for Behavioral Health Specialists





# Preliminary Estimates of the Magnitude of Costs and Savings

---

## **Costs to PCP Practice**

- \$ 17,000 PCP time for screenings
- \$ 47,000/PCP for BH specialist
- \$ 2,400/PCP for psych consults
- \$ 53,000 loss of office visit revenue
  
- \$119,000 Total Cost Per PCP

# Preliminary Estimates of the Magnitude of Costs and Savings

## Costs to PCP Practice

- \$ 17,000 PCP time for screenings
- \$ 47,000/PCP for BH specialist
- \$ 2,400/PCP for psych consults
- \$ 53,000 loss of office visit revenue
  
- \$119,000 Total Cost Per PCP

## Savings in Other Services

- \$ 50,000 fewer PCP office visits
- \$ 18,000 fewer specialist visits
- \$ 1,000 fewer ER visits
- \$ 6,000 fewer hospital admissions
- \$210,000 fewer psych. medications
  
- \$285,000 Total Savings to Payers

# Preliminary Estimates of the Magnitude of Costs and Savings

## Costs to PCP Practice

- \$ 17,000 PCP time for screenings
- \$ 47,000/PCP for BH specialist
- \$ 2,400/PCP for psych consults
- \$ 53,000 loss of office visit revenue
  
- \$119,000 Total Cost Per PCP

## Savings in Other Services

- \$ 50,000 fewer PCP office visits
- \$ 18,000 fewer specialist visits
- \$ 1,000 fewer ER visits
- \$ 6,000 fewer hospital admissions
- \$210,000 fewer psych. medications
  
- \$285,000 Total Savings to Payers
  
- **\$166,000 Net Savings**

# Additional Data/Modeling Needed to Determine Costs and Impacts

Business Case Analysis for Behavioral Health/Primary Care Integration													
User-Selected Parameters Highlighted in Yellow													
Number of PCPs in Practice:	3												
Total Patients/PCP:	2,000												
Total Patients in Practice:	6,000												
% Patients with BH Issues:	17.5%												
Patients w/ BH Issues in Practice:	1,050												

\* avoidable=physical problems caused by unaddressed BH issues

# Options for Payment Models

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1. Add New Fee Codes for Unreimbursed Services
2. Pay Monthly “Care Management” Payments (PMPM) in Addition to Current FFS
3. Shared Savings
4. PMPM Payment + P4P Adjustments
5. Partial Comprehensive Care Payment
6. Full Comprehensive Care Payment

# Most Likely Short-Run Options for Payment Models

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1. Add New Fee Codes for Unreimbursed Services
2. Pay Monthly “Care Management” Payments (PMPM)  
in Addition to Current FFS
3. Shared Savings
4. PMPM Payment + P4P Adjustments
5. Partial Comprehensive Care Payment
6. Full Comprehensive Care Payment

# Options for Paying for Behavioral Health Services in Primary Care

---

- **Screening for behavioral health issues by PCP**
  - **Current Payment:**
    - Screens with negative results not currently paid for
    - Screens with positive results currently are paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Continue as today
    2. Pay for all screens (positive or negative)
    3. Pay through a PMPM payment, not per screen

# Options for Paying for Behavioral Health Services in Primary Care

- **Screening for behavioral health issues by PCP**
  - **Current Payment:**
    - Screens with negative results not currently paid for
    - Screens with positive results currently are paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Continue as today
    2. Pay for all screens (positive or negative)
    3. Pay through a PMPM payment, not per screen
- **Immediate intervention following positive screen by BH Specialist**
  - **Current Payment:** Not currently paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Pay on a programmatic basis, i.e., cover the costs of the staff in a practice
    2. Pay on a PMPM basis



# Options for Paying for Behavioral Health Services in Primary Care

- **Screening for behavioral health issues by PCP**
  - **Current Payment:**
    - Screens with negative results not currently paid for
    - Screens with positive results currently are paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Continue as today
    2. Pay for all screens (positive or negative)
    3. Pay through a PMPM payment, not per screen
- **Immediate intervention following positive screen by BH Specialist**
  - **Current Payment:** Not currently paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Pay on a programmatic basis, i.e., cover the costs of the staff in a practice
    2. Pay on a PMPM basis
- **Follow-up care by BH Specialist in PCP practice**

(For patients who warrant services before or instead of transfer to external BH services)

  - **Current Payment:** Depending on the credentials of the Behavioral Health Specialist, they (or the PCP practice) may or may not be eligible to bill for these services



# Options for Paying for Behavioral Health Services in Primary Care

- **Screening for behavioral health issues by PCP**
  - **Current Payment:**
    - Screens with negative results not currently paid for
    - Screens with positive results currently are paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Continue as today
    2. Pay for all screens (positive or negative)
    3. Pay through a PMPM payment, not per screen
- **Immediate intervention following positive screen by BH Specialist**
  - **Current Payment:** Not currently paid for
  - **Options for Future:**
    1. Pay on a programmatic basis, i.e., cover the costs of the staff in a practice
    2. Pay on a PMPM basis
- **Follow-up care by BH Specialist in PCP practice**


(For patients who warrant services before or instead of transfer to external BH services)

  - **Current Payment:** Depending on the credentials of the Behavioral Health Specialist, they (or the PCP practice) may or may not be eligible to bill for these services
- **Follow-up care by external behavioral health services**
  - **Current Payment:** Paid for


# Potential Payment Model for Better BH Care in Primary Care



# Maintain FFS for Current Services



# Performance-Based PMPM for Additional/Enhanced Services



# Potential Payment Model for Better BH Care in Primary Care

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## **1. Fee for Service Payment (Same as Current)**

- Payment per office visits
- Payment for use of SBIRT/IMPACT Screening Tool with positive result

## **2. Per Member Per Month Payment (New)**

- Payment covers costs of behavioral health specialists and support staff
- Payment covers equipment for video links to offsite staff
- Payment covers time for physician to do proactive screening
- Payment offsets losses in office visit revenue from patients who would otherwise have returned for behavioral health-driven physical problems

## **3. Pay for Performance (New)**

- Increase in PMPM payment based on reduction in utilization of other services by practice patients (ideally should be combined with broader PCMH or chronic disease management support)
- Reduction in PMPM payment for failure to carry out screening

# Other Support Needed and Issues to Be Resolved

- **Support from all payers for improved care**
  - PCP practices won't be able/willing to do screening only for one payer's patients
  - If a significant portion of savings will come from psychiatric medications, the state will have to participate as a "payer"
- **Coordination with PCMH & chronic disease management programs**
  - Better for patients if BH & physical issues can be managed in a coordinated way
  - Difficult to separate impact of BH vs. other initiatives on avoidable ER visits, specialty referrals, medications, etc.
- **Coordination and information sharing among involved providers**
  - PCPs, psychiatrists, and BH providers will need clear protocols for referrals and communication of information
  - Legal barriers to sharing BH information will need to be addressed
- **Recruitment and training of behavioral health staff**
  - More trained Behavioral Health Specialists will be needed to work in PCP practices
  - Licensure/accreditation/certification requirements for BH services will need to change to allow billing for BH services delivered in PCP practices
- **Patient education and engagement**
  - Patients should be encouraged to talk to their PCPs about behavioral health issues
  - Patient cost-sharing barriers to PCP services need to be removed

# How Do You Develop Win-Win-Win Solutions?

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
- What will there be less of, and how much does that save?
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# A Critical Element is Shared, Trusted Data

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- **Physician/Hospital** need to know the current utilization and costs for their patients to know whether the new payment model will cover the costs of delivering effective care to the patients
- **Purchaser/Payer** needs to know the current utilization and costs to know whether the new payment model is a better deal than they have today
- **Both** sets of data have to match in order for providers and payers to agree on the new approach!

# Details on All the Steps Are in This Free Publication



**Making the Business Case for Payment and Delivery Reform**

Robert Wood Johnson Foundation

Harold D. Miller  
Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform

To learn more about RWJF-supported payment reform activities, visit RWJF's Payment Reform webpage ([www.rwjf.org/en/topics/rwjf-topic-areas/payment-reform.html](http://www.rwjf.org/en/topics/rwjf-topic-areas/payment-reform.html))

For additional resources on health care payment reform, visit [www.paymentreform.org](http://www.paymentreform.org)

Tens of billions of dollars in health care spending could be saved every year by avoiding unnecessary tests, procedures, emergency room visits, and hospitalizations; by reducing infections, complications, and errors in the tests and procedures that are performed; and by preventing serious conditions and providing treatment at earlier and lower-cost stages of disease. However, current health care payment systems create large and often insurmountable barriers to the changes in patient care needed to achieve these benefits.

In order to support improvements in both health care delivery and payment systems, individuals and organizations that purchase health care services need a clear *business case* showing that the proposed change in care will achieve sufficient benefits to justify whatever change in payment health care providers need to support the change in care. Health care providers also need a clear business case showing that they will be able to successfully deliver high-quality care in a financially sustainable way under the new payment system.

This report describes a 10 step process to develop such a business case:

- Step 1. Define the planned change in care and the results it is expected to achieve.
- Step 2. Estimate how the type and volume of services will change.
- Step 3. Determine how payments/revenues will change under the current payment system.
- Step 4. Determine how the costs of services will change.
- Step 5. Calculate the changes in operating margins for providers.
- Step 6. Identify the changes in payment needed by providers to maintain positive operating margins.
- Step 7. Determine whether a business case exists for both purchasers and providers.
- Step 8. Refine the changes in care to improve the business case.
- Step 9. Analyze the impact of potential deviations from planned care and expected outcomes.
- Step 10. Design a payment model that pays adequately for desired services, assures desired outcomes, and controls variation and risk.

The report also describes the four major types of data that will generally be needed to carry out all of the steps in a good business case analysis:

- Health care billing/claims data;
- Clinical data from electronic health records or patient registries;
- Data on the costs of health care services; and
- Data on patient-reported outcomes.

nrhi Network for Regional Healthcare Improvement

**Center for Healthcare Quality and Payment Reform**  
[www.PaymentReform.org](http://www.PaymentReform.org)

# What Kind of Data Do You Need?

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- **Healthcare Billings/Claims Data (Payers)**
  - Data on (billable) services delivered
  - Data on payment amounts for services, if released
    - *It's hard to save someone money if they won't tell you what they're paying now*
  - Does not include information on unbillable services or costs
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- **Data on Patient-Reported Outcomes (Surveys)**
  - Information on benefits to patients beyond the services they received, such as quality of life, ability to work and perform activities of daily living

# How Do You Develop Win-Win-Win Solutions?

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
## 3. Designing a Payment Model That Supports Change

- Flexibility to change the way care is delivered
- Accountability for costs and quality/outcomes related to care
- Adequate payment to cover lowest-achievable costs
- Protection for the provider from insurance risk

# Opportunities and Solutions Vary By Specialty

	<b><i>Opportunities to Improve Care and Reduce Cost</i></b>	<b><i>Barriers in Current Payment System</i></b>	<b><i>Solutions via Accountable Payment Models</i></b>
Cardiology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use less invasive and expensive procedures when appropriate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Payment is based on which procedure is used, not the outcome for the patient</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Condition-based payment covering CABG, PCI, or medication management</li> </ul>
Orthopedic Surgery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce infections and complications</li> <li>• Use less expensive post-acute care following surgery</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No flexibility to increase inpatient services to reduce complications &amp; post-acute care</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Episode payment for hospital and post-acute care costs with warranty</li> </ul>
Psychiatry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce ER visits and admissions for patients with depression and chronic disease</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No payment for phone consults with PCPs</li> <li>• No payment for RN care managers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint condition-based payment to PCP and psychiatrist</li> </ul>
OB/GYN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce use of elective C-sections</li> <li>• Reduce early deliveries and use of NICU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Similar/lower payment for vaginal deliveries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Condition-based payment for total cost of delivery in low-risk pregnancy</li> </ul>

# More Information on Structuring Payment Models



Center for Healthcare Quality  
and Payment Reform  
[www.PaymentReform.org](http://www.PaymentReform.org)

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
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
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## **4. Getting Payers to Use the Payment Model**

# Biggest Barrier? Medicare & Health Plans Don't Want to Change




# One Payer Changing Is Not Enough



***Provider is only compensated for changed practices  
for the subset of patients covered by participating payers***


# All Payers Need to Change to Enable Providers to Transform






# What About The Patient?


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# Payment Reform Only Deals With Half of the Relationship




# Benefit Design Changes Are Also Critical to Success



# Example: Coordinating Pharmacy & Medical Benefits

Single-minded focus on reducing costs here...




## Pharmacy Benefits

Drug Costs

- High copays for brand-names when no generic exists
- Doughnut holes & deductibles

*Principal treatment for most chronic diseases involves regular use of maintenance medication*

...could result in higher spending on hospitalizations



## Medical Benefits

Hospital Costs

Physician Costs

Other Services





# For More Information:

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[www.CHQPR.org](http://www.CHQPR.org)

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